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ABstrACt
This article attempts to clarify the concept of taqiyya (or 
dissimulation for religious purposes). It will examine if 
the concept is coherent, and whether practices of taqiyya 
follow its concept.  The article first discusses the concept 
of taqiyya. Second, it reviews historical examples of its 
practice. Third, it examines the implications of the Ninth 
Commandment in the Bible. Fourth, it discusses the notion 
of ‘speaking justly’ in the Qur’an. And fifth, it examines 
the manner in which the practice of taqiyya, often deviates 
from its concept.
introduction
Can we lie in order to protect ourselves and protect our faith? 
This article aims to examine the concept and the practices of taqiyya. 
By examining it, I wish to demonstrate that taqiyya is conceptually 
coherent though its practice might be abused to the degree that it deviates 
from the concept.  In other words, this article will be an intellectual 
exercise comparing the concept and practices of taqiyya. Moreover, 
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one of the Ten Commandments prohibits us to bear false witness. 
This article brings into focus some questions such as: What is the concept 
of taqiyya? Is such concept coherent? Do practices of taqiyya concur with 
its concept? Does taqiyya violate the Ninth Commandment or the duty 
to not lie? What I mean by ‘to violate’ is failing or breaking to comply 
with a rule. In this particular case, the rule is the Ninth  Commandment. 
Firstly, I will discuss the concept of taqiyya. Secondly, its historical 
references as well as its practices will be discussed. Thirdly, it will examine 
the implications of the Ninth Commandment. Fourthly, it will examine 
the notion of speaking justly in Qur’an. Fifthly, it will review a deviation 
of the practices from the concept of taqiyya. Then, I will conclude the 
discussion in the last section. 
the Concept of Taqiyya 
This section strives to illuminate the formal concept of taqiyya. 
The concept of taqiyya needs to be distinguished from other ideas such as 
zaringί (cleverness), kizb (lie), hίlah (artifice), gúl (wiles), makkár (crafty), 
talbίs (deceit), firiftan (deceive) rihá (evasion), riyá kardan (dissemble), 
zabán-bazi (prevarication), firίb (fraud), jίb (fob), ίlchί-gari (diplomacy), 
sákhtah (trick), and probably the arcane discipline (due to its virtue of 
silence). Indeed, there are two constitutive elements of the concept of 
taqiyya, to wit, religious dissimulation  and persecution. In other words, 
the concept is religious dissimulation for the sake of preserving life – not 
necessarily religion – to the extent that one’s belief remains firm under 
the threat of persecution. Moreover, dissimulation refers to hiding or to 
concealing one’s character, feelings, thoughts, or preventing those things 
to be known by others. Therefore, practitioners of dissimulation use it as 
a type of precautionary measure against persecution. Persecution itself 
means oppression, ill-treatment and hostility which can be caused by 
religious, political or racial factors. These factors do not have to appear 
all at once. If one factor is present, then the dissimulation could be justly 
conducted for the sake of preserving life. 
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Unfortunately, proponents of taqiyya seem to conduct the 
religious dissimulation merely based on danger which is a bit different 
from harm and indeed true persecution. On the one hand, danger refers 
to the mere possibility of being injured or harmed. On the other hand, 
harm refers to the real physical injury, pain, distress or hardship which 
is conducted directly. If harm is intentionally done based on political, 
racial or religious discrimination, then it is considered persecution. 
In short, danger could imply harm while the latter could imply persecution. 
Yet, they are not the same things. 
Interestingly, some people think that the best form of taqiyya  
is tawriya (evasion). For instance, As-Sayid Ar-Radi gives an example 
about who the legitimate vicegerent of Prophet is. An evasive view would be, 
on the one hand, “He that his (Prophet’s) daughter was in his house,” 
to wit, ‘Ali or, on the other hand, “He whose daughter was in his (i.e., 
Prophet’s) house” viz., Abu Bakr (As-Sayid Ar-Radi in Rizvi, 1992: 11-3)” 
If such rhetoric is accepted, then taqiyya includes cunning because evasion 
contains the intention to deflect a controversial truth. Such deflection is 
exercised by a cunning person to deceive others. However, if such person 
did not face any persecution in replying, then his reply cannot be taken 
as taqiyya because persecution constitutes the existence of taqiyya. 
Additionally, two further questions might be considered here: Is a son 
in law (the Holy Prophet) a part of the family of his father in law 
(Abu Bakr)? Or is a father-in-law (Abu Bakr) a part of the family of 
his son-in-law (the Holy Prophet)? The answer actually depends on the 
concept of a family in a particular culture. If Arabic culture exercises 
patriarchy, then those two questions are irrelevant because the Holy 
Prophet has no lineage from Abu Bakr. In other words, it might be useless 
to evade others who are aware about the cultural meaning of such tricky 
utterance. On the contrary, Imam Ali is really the part of Holy Prophet’s 
family due to his position as a cousin as well as a son in law of the Holy 
Prophet. Therefore, we could say that his answer is to Hazrat Ali instead 
of Abu Bakr. 
4   Prajñā Vihāra
The concept should also be distinguished from the notion of 
‘deception’ which means deliberately promoting a falsehood as a truth. 
In contrast, taqiyya deals with the notion of hiding instead of deceiving. 
As a proverb compels (x) ‘tell the truth,’ and then an Arabic wisdom compels 
(y) “Not all that is known should be said.” At this point, proposition (y) 
does not mean deceiving though it could be considered as an evasion as 
well as a diplomacy, and it could not be considered as taqiyya because there 
is no one slain. Moreover, such proposition is sound due to the absence 
of moral obligation to share all things but the obligation not to lie. Here, 
there is a distinction between telling lies and keeping information. The 
previous implies a violation of moral obligation while the latter implies 
a limited sharing of information. 
Mahon furthermore identifies four categories that are essential 
to the determination of lying or deception. These are: the intention, the 
addressee condition, the untruthfulness condition and the statement 
condition (2008). First of all, the intention comprises three types viz., 
(1) the intention to deceive the liee about the content of the statement, 
(2) the intention to deceive the liee about the liar’s beliefs, (3) the 
intention to deceive the liee about the liar’s being sincere (Mahon, 2008). 
Here, taqiyya seems to include the second intention because by hiding 
the agent’s belief for the sake of avoiding persecution, then he or she is 
lying about his or her belief to the liee. Moreover, Mahon emphasizes 
that such intention should be addressed to persons. Thereby, expressing 
false statements to, for instance children or insane adults, could not be 
considered as lying (Mahon, 2008). Secondly, the addressee condition 
requires two persons or more. Therefore, this condition does not recognize 
the notion of self-deception (Mahon, 2008). Thirdly, the untruthfulness 
condition distinguishes between ‘believed to be false’ and ‘be false.’ 
Indeed, the notion of believing is central here. As a consequence, an 
intended lie cannot be a deception if the lie is, unknown to the liar, actually 
a fact. In short, a truth might be formed through an untruthful statement 
(Mahon, 2008). Fourthly, the statement condition includes a person’s 
utterance, expressions and language. However, silence might imply a 
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lie even though it is not spoken. Mahon indeed claims that ‘lying under 
duress’ is a contradictio in terminis  because such action is made on the 
condition of no freedom (Mahon, 2008). If taqiyya is a form of lying 
under duress, then taqiyya itself is a contradictio in terminis. However, 
one might distinguish thoroughly between the notion of lying and hiding 
in order to rebut such claim. 
Interestingly, Mahon poses the question whether the wrongness of 
lying is an analytic or a synthetic judgment (Mahon, 2008)? By the same 
token, I could pose a similar question, whether the rightness or wrongness 
of taqiyya an analytic or a synthetic judgment? On the one hand, if one 
examines the concept of taqiyya, then he or she is actually making an 
analytic judgment. On the other hand, if one examines the practices of 
taqiyya, then he or she is actually making a synthetic judgment. This 
distinction highlights the potential difference between the concept and 
the practice of taqiyya. 
The word taqiyya is not explicitly mentioned in Qur’an. Yet, there 
might be a hidden concept as well as the dalil naqli of taqiyya in the Holy 
Book. Chapter Ali Imran verse 28-9 says: 
“Let not the believers take for friends or helpers Unbelievers  
rather than believers: if any do that, in nothing will there 
be help from God: except by way of precaution, that ye 
may guard yourselves from them. But God cautions you 
(to remember) Himself; for the final goal is to God. Say: 
‘Whether ye hide what is in your hearts or reveal it, God 
knows it all: He knows what is in the heavens, and what 
is on Earth. And God has power over all things” (in Ali, 
NY: 47). 
Tafsir Al-Jalalayn interprets such verse: “tuqātan, ‘as a safeguard’, 
is the verbal noun from taqiyyatan” in Qur’an 3: 28 (Al-Mahalli and 
al-Suyuti, 2007: 58). Indeed, Barletta interprets such verse: “The English 
phrase ‘guard yourselves against them, guarding carefully’ in the verses 
above comes directly from the Arabic tattaqu¯ minhum tuqa¯tan, and both 
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tattaqu¯‘you [pl.] guard’ and tuqa¯tan (an adverbial intensifier) share the 
same root (w-q-a¯) as taqiyya...” (Barletta, 2008: 564). Moreover, verse 
makes the point that (1) favouring unbelievers instead of believers to be 
the friends and helpers is forbidden, and (2) an exception can be made 
when a believer would be harmed if they do not make friendship with 
the unbelievers. Yet, the Qur’an does not specifically indicate political 
affiliation of unbelievers because the Qur’an never deals with details. 
Indeed, an emphasis should be made here on the distinction between the 
unbelievers and the non-Muslims (including Christians, Jews and other 
religious people). Moreover, the context of the verse is a warning from 
Allah after a previous warning – from Sa’d bin Hatsamah, Abdullah bin 
Jubair and Rifa’ah bin Al-Mundzir – was ignored by some people of the 
Anshar community. These people were induced to leave Islam as well 
as appoint non-Muslims to be their protectors. However, the unbelievers 
such as Alhajjaj bin Amr, Qais bin Zaid, Ibnu Abil Haqiq, and Ka’b bin 
Al-Asyraf fail to convince them because of this warning (Qamaruddin 
Shaleh et. al, NY: 90). Nevertheless, Allah provides an exception where 
Muslims might conduct a precautionary action against persecution by 
taking the unbelievers either as helpers or as alliances. 
Another hidden concept as well as the dalil naqli of taqiyya is 
Chapter Al Nahl verse 106 which commands: “Any one who, after 
accepting faith in God, utters Unbelief -- except under compulsion, 
his heart remaining firm in Faith -- but such as open their breast to 
Unbelief, on them is Wrath from God, and theirs will be a dreadful Penalty” 
(in Ali, NY: 257). 
There are two historical contexts for such verses. Firstly, the 
Quraisy ethnic groups tortured some individuals who strove to relocate 
themselves from Mecca to Medina. As a consequence, some of those 
migrants are forced to be infidels. Then, Allah made a revelation to the 
Prophet Muhammad saying that Allah will forgive such a thing if, and only 
if, there is faith in their hearts. Secondly, there was a dialogue between 
the Prophet Muhammad and Ammar bin Yasir who just saved himself 
from an unjust detainment by a tribe of polytheists. Indeed, Ammar’s 
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eloquent rhetoric astonished the polytheists, and he was therefore set 
free. The Prophet Muhammad asked Ammar whether his rhetoric was 
sincere. Ammar replied no. This verse confirms that Allah will not put a 
curse on those who are forced to be atheists insofar as they keep the faith 
(Shaleh et al., NY: 286-7). By these two examples, Allah seems to allow 
a practice of taqiyya. The concept holds that no one may convert unless 
under the compulsion, and if they are forced to convert, they ought to 
hold the faith firmly in their hearts. The notion of compulsion questions 
the coherency of such concept. Imagine that the compulsion is an 
unjust one, then how can we know that the faith is genuine? The Prophet 
Muhammad himself could not examine directly whether or not Ammar 
bin Yasir was being honest. Moreover, Allah and Islam do not allow 
hypocrisy  in the sense of there is no consistency between utterances and 
deeds. Therefore the idea of taqiyya cannot be simply understood through 
the above examples, although the notion of ‘a firm faith in the hearts’ is 
still essential for us. 
In addition, the concept of taqiyya is unlikely to be similar with 
the concept of piety. Rizvi, for example, conceives that taqiyya equals 
tuqat which is accordingly synonymous to piety (Rizvi, 1992: 2). 
According to Abu Ja’far Ibn Babawayh, such equivalence roots in Imam 
Ja’far’s view especially when he gave a comment on the Holy Qur’an 
Surah Al-Hujuraat verse 13.  To put it precisely: “Imam Ja’far was asked 
concerning the Word of Allah, Mighty and Glorious is He: “Verily the 
noblest among you, in the sight of Allah, is the most pious” [49, 13]. 
He said: (It means) he who adheres most scrupulously to the practice of 
taqiyya” (Babawayh, 1999: 97). Additionally, taqiyya equals tuqat equals 
piety according to Rizvi (Rizvi, 1992: 2). Nevertheless, piety has a 
different concept compared to taqiyya viz., the quality of reverence 
or being religious. Thereby, aligning the concept of taqiyya with piety 
implies two questions at least: how could a religious dissimulation 
(against persecution) be similar with the quality of being religious? Does 
not reverence need no dissimulation at all because God will assist all 
pious persons? Unfortunately, Rizvi provides no further explanations and 
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answers to such questions. An answer to the first question might be in the 
realm of consequentialist account of ethics, but unfortunately proponents 
of taqiyya treat the concept as a virtue or a duty. If this is the case, then 
the first question could not be replied convincingly because it seems 
to be a contradictio in terminis. Shouldn’t a religious person express 
his or her religious belief without concealment? By showing his or her 
religious belief, this person would be able to propagate his or her faith. 
Moreover, the second question deals with a contradictio in terminis of 
aligning taqiyya with piety or tuqat. Briefly, proponents of taqiyya seem 
to obfuscate the concept. 
In a nutshell, taqiyya is a coherent concept to the extent that the 
concept is dissimulating one’s religious belief in order to preserve life 
(not necessarily religion) against persecution. The claim of coherency 
lies in the prerequisite of religious dissimulation viz., the existence of 
persecution. Yet, its proponents might practically deviate from it as I will 
discuss in the next section. 
the practices of Taqiyya 
The way people put taqiyya into practice often deviates from 
its concept. In this section I will examine these pseudo-practices. Such 
distinction is based on the concept of taqiyya as I have discussed in the 
previous section. 
The historical fact that Sayyidina Ali lived under three caliphs be 
fore him (Abu Bakar, Umar ibn Khattab and Usman ibn Affan) is usually 
taken as a classical example and a justification for taqiyya . For example, 
Walker refers taqiyya to Imam Ali’s life. Walker claims that Ali swore 
loyalty to the three caliphs (Walker, 2014). Nevertheless, such claim 
ignores the political background. Jafri et al., for instance, believe that the 
case demonstrates a tension between the northern and southern Arabian 
traditions concerning who the successor of late Prophet Muhammad 
should be. On the one hand, seniority in age and ability in leadership are 
two decisive points to succession in the northern Arab tribes (Jafri et al., 
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2014). Thereby, proposing Abu Bakar – who is also the Prophet’s father-
in-law – who is persuaded by Umar ibn Khattab (Mutahhari in Thalib, 
2009: 240). On the other hand, divine rights and hereditary sanctity are two 
main essential points to succession in the southern Arab tribes. Therefore, 
Ali – the Prophet’s cousin; his son in law; the first man who recognized 
Muhammad’s prophecy; and had been educated by the Prophet since he 
was child – should be the first caliph. Indeed, such view is justified by the 
Gadhir Khumm [a pond between Mecca and Medina] sermon delivered 
by the Prophet (Mutahhari in Thalib, 2009: 211-25). In other words, one 
might say that the case is about the struggle of power between primarily 
the companions of the Prophet against the family of the late Prophet. 
On the contrary, Ali remained calm and he did not pursue the opportunity 
to be the first caliph because he realized that there would be a total war 
within Arabia. Even though Ali and his family faced persecution and 
attacks on their home, he did not conduct the religious dissimulation and 
did not acquiesce to the rulers though the latter sometimes asked Ali’s 
views on many problems. Furthermore, he did not join the government 
because Ali followed a reclusive life right after the death of Fatima and 
the Holy Prophet at the same year. In a nutshell, taqiyya could not be 
referred to Ali’s reclusive life from 11 A. H., up to 35 A. H. 
Furthermore, taqiyya does not imply estrangement from the 
world. In other words, taqiyya allows involvement in the world including 
politics and government. Moreover, taqiyya implies a boundary between 
an agent and a persecutor. On the contrary, Hazrat Ali lived an unsocial 
reclusive life. Yet, such reclusion was only because of his circumstances. 
The Prophet had appointed Ali as his vicegerent on the Gadhir Khumm, 
but then some companions “conspired” against him. However, Ali continued 
to impart his knowledge and wisdom for the three caliphs. Umar ibn 
Khattab, for example, made some consultations to Ali, and the latter 
supervised sincerely though Umar is the one who persuaded Banu Sa’ida, 
Ansar and Muhajirun to elect Abu Bakar as the first caliph instead of 
Ali. Furthermore, Umar ibn Khattab enjoyed the transfer of power from 
Abu Bakar to himself by no election. In short, there is no alienation from 
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the world Ali’s refusal to join the government. Ali continued to give 
supervision due to his knowledge and wisdom. 
Additionally, we could learn from the history of Imam Hassan 
and Hussein. On the one hand, had Imam Hussein ibn Ali – the younger 
one – held taqiyya, he would not be beheaded by Yazid ibn Muawiyah in 
Karbala. In this particular case, it is difficult to support a view which says 
that Imam Hussein was not in favor of taqiyya because he thought that the 
consequence of taqiyya would damage the belief of his followers (Rizvi, 
1992: 13). However, a more prudent interpretation would be that he felt 
that taqiyya would be useless since Yazid’s main purpose was eliminating 
Imam Ali’s offspring. What would the historical evidence be that Imam 
Hussein really held such a view? In addition, Imam Hussein could never 
know what the result of taqiyya would be because he did not practice it. 
Indeed, Imam Hussein was inclined to follow his beloved father who did 
not join the government of three caliphs. Therefore, taqiyya seems to be 
practiced neither by Imam Ali nor Imam Hussein. In the case of Imam 
Hussein, one might distinguish between being slain and being conquered. 
Hobbes interestingly conceives it in Leviathan: 
“Conquest, is not the Victory itself; but the Acquisition by 
Victory, of a Right, over the persons of men. He therefore 
that is slain is Overcome, but not Conquered: He that is 
taken, and put into prison, or chains, is not Conquered, 
though Overcome...” (Hobbes, 1985: 720).  
This means that, if one does not resort to taqiyya, then neither he 
himself nor his conviction can be conquered, as in the case of being slain. 
Here, Hobbes account concurs with our analysis that the preservation of 
Islam, not necessarily its school of thoughts, does not rely on the existence 
of its adherents but rather on the Holy Qur’an. 
In contrast, Imam Khomeini relates some fascinating accounts of 
taqiyya because his account not only holds that the existence of Islam 
and its school of thoughts rely on the existence of its adherents but also 
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strives to inhibit the agents of taqiyya. His argument proceeds as below: 
1) One must determine the number of agents of 
imperialism as well as pay close attention to the principle 
of taqiyya in order to establish and speak about an Islamic 
government (Khomeini, 1979: 20). 
2) One must consider the main cause of taqiyya viz., 
the fear of the existence of true religion before the 
tyrannical rulers instead of the safety of themselves. If they 
are reluctant to conduct taqiyya, the existence of Islam 
would be put at stake (Khomeini, 1979: 54). 
3) Taqiyya must not be done by the Islamic jurists 
(fuqaha) due to their functions and positions as the 
experts of Islamic law, and Islam would be unclean had the 
jurists resorted to taqiyya. Indeed, Khomeini emphasized 
that Imam Ja’far saying (‘taqiyya is my religion, and the 
religion of my forefathers’) does not apply to the jurists 
unless there is a rational basis for doing so. In other words, 
taqiyya could be perceived as ablution either by water or 
dust, dependent on the situation (Khomeini, 1979: 115-6). 
4) Fear for the existence of Islam is the real basis of taqiyya 
instead of fear for one’s life (Khomeini, 1979: 118).   
Nevertheless, Imam Khomeini’s account (of taqiyya and the 
jurists) – respectfully – is open to some criticism. The first premise is 
important because, I suppose, Khomeini would like to distinguish friend 
from foe. Nevertheless, if an Islamic government relies on taqiyya, then 
it means the government should wait for the threat of persecution because 
the concept of taqiyya requires the existence of persecution. The second 
premise is unfortunately unsound because the purity of Islam does not 
depend on individual jurists but is located in Qur’an the Holy Book which 
is guaranteed by Allah to be pure forever. The fourth premise also seems 
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unconvincing because the jurists (not necessarily the Imams) have the 
same rights as ordinary people on the issue of preserving life. Indeed, the 
existence and the purity of Islam do not depend on the jurists but rather 
on the Qur’an which is guaranteed by Allah to always be pure. 
Another practical deviation of taqiyya is presented by this account: 
“And Imam Ja’far said: Verily, I hear a man abusing me in 
the mosque; and I hide myself behind a pillar so that he may 
not see me. And he (Imam Ja’far) said: Mix with the people 
(enemies) outwardly, but oppose them inwardly, so long as 
the Amirate (imratun) is a matter of opinion. And he also 
said: Verily diplomacy (arri ‘a’) with a true believer is a 
form of shirk (polytheism); but with a hypocrite ( munafiq) 
in his own house, it is worship” (Babawayh, 1999: 97-8). 
Such account is not taqiyya. Some cases should be examined 
separately because they are arguably dissimilar. First is the case of physical 
dissimulation. It is different because it is visible as opposed to religious 
dissimulation which is invisible. The former does not imply the latter. 
If it did, then playing hide and seek world require children to dissimulate 
their beliefs as well. Yet, this is implausible because such game merely 
practice physical dissimulation while, in contrast, taqiyya requires 
religious dissimulation. Second is the case of mingling with enemies. 
Insofar as conflicting political communities do not wage neither a 
limited nor total war, then mingling is normal under an oppressive regime. 
One does not need to resort to taqiyya for living together. Here, there is 
a confusion of taqiyya with mingling. Third is case of doing diplomacy 
with enemies. Such an exclusion is implausible because people negotiate 
in all situations including war. If two warring political communities have 
the opportunity to negotiate a truce, then all proponents of taqiyya would 
favor diplomacy. Furthermore, taqiyya is perceived by some proponents 
as an obligation which holds the same importance as shalat. Babawayh 
claims: “Our belief concerning taqiyya (permissible dissimulation) is that 
it is obligatory, and he who forsakes it is in the same position as he who 
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forsakes prayer” (Babawayh, 1999: 96). If this is the case, can prayers be 
replaced by taqiyya? If shalat is a pillar of Islam, then is taqiyya also a 
pillar of Islam? Babawayh’s argument needs to be considered thoroughly, 
and one should not accept it uncritically because it might be a deviation 
of taqiyya, as I will discuss in the last section. 
A controversial practice of taqiyya is seen in India and Spain. 
The Indian Guptis lived incognito as Hindus instead of Sunni Muslims, 
and indeed they even burned corpses (Virani, 2011: 99-100). According 
to Virani, two details of taqiyya might be dismissed by Shi’i dissimulators 
viz., (1) do not disseminate esoteric teachings to those who are not ready, 
and (2) conceal the link between the imam and his followers, as exposure 
would lead to danger (Virani, 2011: 101). Interestingly, the Guptis believe 
that they could be both Hindus and Muslims. They believed that there 
is no contradiction between those two faiths. They furthermore argue 
that if it is admissible to be a Muslim as well as believing the teaching 
of Isa A. S., then there is no contradiction to be a Muslim and believing 
in the avatars (Virani, 2011: 125-7). Nor as a temporary mechanism, 
the Guptis are in favour of prolonging taqiyya for the lifetime of its 
preachers should they deal with pogroms. Moreover, they perceive that 
taqiyya has an adaptive, dynamic nature. Consequently, the pure hidden 
identity should also be preserved by a strong intrinsic nucleus which is 
-- in the case of Ismailis -- manifested in the imam of the time (Virani, 
2011: 132-3). Actually, taqiyya which involves a second religion is not 
unique to the Guptis but had been practiced by the 16th century Moriscos 
against the Spanish Inquisition. Interestingly, they did it for centuries 
rather than for a short period of time. They practiced taqiyya for more 
than one generation because the Turks unfortunately did not restore the 
Islamic power as the Mufti of Oran previously announced it through his 
fatwa (Rosa-Rodriguez, 2010: 153). Similarly, Barletta claims “...the 
principle of taqiyya came to have an important place within the underground 
religious activities of Castile’s recently converted Muslims after 1502, 
and it was rapidly applied within the communities of Aragonese 
converts after 1526” (Barletta, 2008: 564). Nonetheless, the Gupti’s Ismaili 
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dissimulation as Hindus and the Spanish Moriscos are some “extreme” 
examples of inappropriate practices of taqiyya though they were in 
response to harassment. It is extreme because the veneer in both cases is 
neither as Sunni Muslims, Sufi nor the Twelver. In contrast, why didn’t 
they emigrate (hijrah as the Prophet did from Mecca to Medina) instead 
of living under the hostile Hindu regime? For instance, besides resorting 
to taqiyya, some other Moroccans migrated to Iran in 1986 right after 
the persecution against the Baha’is (Zweiri and Konig, 2008: 520). 
Hijrah is essential here to avoid resorting to taqiyya. If Muslims live under 
occupation, then why didn’t emigrate as the Prophet did? However, this 
criticism could not be used on the case of Palestine where they arguably 
maintain al-Quds (Jerusalem). 
The 1979 Islamic revolution of Iran could be considered a turning 
point against the practices of taqiyya. Shiite Muslims around the globe now 
have an established Shi’ite political power. Few days before the returning 
of Imam Khomeini, an Iranian magazine published a poem as following: 
“The day the Imam returns 
no one will tell lies any more 
no one will lock the doors of his house; 
people will become brothers 
sharing the bread of their joys together 
in justice and in sincerity...” (in Simpson, 1989: 36-7). 
The second line of such poem might refer to taqiyya because 
Iranians formerly eschewed the perils of Pahlevi’s military and SAVAK. 
Campbell, for example, pays a very serious attention to taqiyya in the 
case of Iran and wrote at least four articles in the National Observer. 
Firstly, Campbell points to four factors which are responsible for Iran’s 
propensity for deception through history viz., taarof (“a form of deception 
through diversion of meaning from the subject or issue under discussion”), 
khod’eh (“trickery or claiming one’s true position by half-truths rather 
than outright lies or deception”), kitman (deception) or taqiyya. Yet he 
claims that these terms are “often used synonymously” (Campbell, 2006b: 
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1, 5). But he is mistaken because these terms have distinct meanings. 
Campbell fails to recognize the appropriate concept of taqiyya which 
deals with the notion of persecution. He also employs his misunderstanding 
of taqiyya as a basis for dissimulation over the case of Iran’s alleged 
nuclear weapons. Indeed, he claims: “Given the proven Iranian capacity 
for deception, combined with the parlous state of intelligence coverage 
of Iran by Western intelligence, there may be a parallel clandestine 
programme and concealed facilities or research programmes using cover 
organisations (Campbell, 2006b: 48).” Secondly, he furthermore claims 
that taqiyya played an important role in the 1979 Islamic revolution. 
To put it in his own words: 
“The CIA documents seized during the Iranian 1979 
takeover of the U.S. Embassy revealed that the approximately 
5,000 “sources of information” were recruited...The 
documents showed that many Iranians agreed to “become 
informants, informers or outright spies partly in order to 
advance their own careers in business or the civil service”. 
Consequently, they fed the United States with “information 
that suited their own personal schemes”. In the 1970s, this 
meant that an unusually high percentage of the information 
gathered was biased or unreliable and contaminated by 
the Iranian passion for deception. The documents also 
demonstrate the vital role of counterintelligence in checking 
the bonafides of Iranian HUMINT (i.e., human intelligence) 
sources” (Campbell, 2006b: 43). 
Moreover, he claims that American and European diplomats have 
been deceived by Iranian diplomats for three decades in the case of Iran’s 
nuclear program. The latter have exercised a combination of taqiyya, 
khod’eh and kitman to do so (Campbell, 2006b: 44). Campbell also 
distinguishes between diplomacy and taqiyya because he considers the 
E.U.-3 as no more than, on the one hand, showing the impotence of 
I.A.E.A., and on the other hand, reflecting the appeasement of European 
diplomacy (Campbell, 2006a: 12-3). He also comprehends that kitman 
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contains an equal meaning to secrecy (Campbell, 2006a: 12).  However, 
Rizvi rebuts such distinction, and he believes that taqiyya  equals diplomacy 
as I will discuss below. 
He erroneously puts taqiyya as a part of kitman  (Campbell, 2006a: 18). 
In fact, some Imams establishes the concept of taqiyya, and such 
establishment does not deal with the idea of kitman. Moreover, Campbell 
notes, “The significant clandestine nuclear network of Dr Abdul Qadeer 
Khan — the Pakistani nuclear engineer who had begun supplying Iran 
with nuclear designs, prototypes and advanced technology in the late 
1980s — was not targeted by U.S./U.K. intelligence until the late 1990s” 
(Campbell, 2006a: 24). Additionally, Rothwell believes that even the 
president of Iran does not know about the nuclear program. He wrote: 
“Rothwell describes the secrecy cloaking Iran’s nuclear 
programmes: “The reality … is hard even for quasi-insiders 
to fathom. One Tehran observer with former ties to the 
power structure said in an interview that not even [the then] 
President Khatami and his ministers would know the truth 
about Iran’s nuclear program. Outside the closed scientific 
facilities, said this source: ‘You could count on the fingers 
of one hand the number of people who know the real goal 
of Iran’s nuclear project’”” (Rothwell in Campbell, 2006a: 
19-20). 
How extensive is secrecy in Iran that even its president did not 
know about the nuclear program? If Khatami’s administration knew 
nothing, then who would know it? If supposing the Supreme Leader 
was one of the few who knew the truth about nuclear program, then, 
why not share it with the president? Insofar that neither Rothwell nor 
Campbell give a sound argument for such ultimate secrecy of the nuclear 
program, then such a claim would be no more than a fantasy. Furthermore, 
Campbell describes how big the political contribution of taqiyya for the 
Islamic revolution was leading the CIA to repeatedly err their analysis 
from 1977 up to 1979.
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“The C.I.A. has an especially poor predictive record. 
In August 1977, its 60-page study, Iran in the 1980s, assessed 
that the Shah would be “an active participant in Iranian life 
well into the 1980s”. In August 1978, the C.I.A.’s benign 
23-page assessment of the Pahlavi dynasty/Shah’s régime, 
Iran After the Shah, declared in its preface: “Iran is not in a 
revolutionary or even a ‘prerevolutionary’ situation.” 58 In 
November 1978, an assessment was satisfied that the Shah 
was “not paralysed with indecision” and was generally 
“in touch with reality”, 59 even though he was suffering 
from cancer and adversely effected by his medication. 
Only two months later, the Shah and his régime collapsed. 
According to a former C.I.A. officer: “Even when Ayatollah 
Khomeini was in exile outside of Paris, the C.I.A. avoided 
him and his entourage. So when the Iranian revolution 
went down in 1979, the C.I.A. was blind and deaf in Iran”” 
(Campbell, 2006a: 20-1). 
The prevalent methodological vulnerability of CIA is accordingly 
the failure to recognize taqiyya and kitman in the first place (Campbell, 
2006a: 23). Contrary to Campbell’s account, an appropriate orientalist 
account of taqiyya is given by Bernard Lewis. He precisely conceives, 
“The term taqiyya, caution, precaution, denotes an Islamic concept of 
dispensation – the idea that under compulsion or menace, a believer may 
be dispensed from fulfilling certain conditions of religion … It was used 
to justify the concealment of beliefs likely to arouse the hostility of the 
authorities or the populace”” (Lewis in Campbell, 2005a: 13). This is an 
objective orientalist view about taqiyya. It converts the concept of taqiyya 
which is passive, into the active one. Campbell provocatively notes: 
“Of the 55 Caliphs (successors list), including the first 
four caliphs, an estimated 18 to 26 were assassinated. The 
Assassins pioneered Islamic “martyrdom operations”, 
whose volunteers called themselves fidaen from the 
Arabic fidaii — a person ready to sacrifice his life for Islam. 
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The fidayiyaah (fidais or fidawis), or the “self-sacrificers”, 
specialised in targeted assassination of elite political, 
religious or military leaders...Using taqiyya, the Assassins 
became masters of disguise and often assumed the shape of 
the enemy...Using taqiyya the assassins posed as servants, 
advisors, soldiers, Sufis or Christian monks and ascetics 
to gain access to their target and humiliated and shamed 
the victim” (Campbell, 2005a: 15). Additionally, he also 
loosened taqiyya into some modes such as outwitting and 
the role-playing as victims (Campbell, 2005a: 16, 20). 
Such claim is unfortunately inaccurate since neither Sunni nor 
Shi’i Muslims recognize all of those 55 caliphs. He also ignores that the 
concept of taqiyya does not deal with an aggressive attack but rather a 
mechanism of defense against hostile rulers. In other words, Campbell 
supports the practical deviation of taqiyya from its concept. 
Furthermore, Campbell fallaciously believes that multiculturalism 
is a favorable milieu for taqiyya because of immigration policies which 
permit Muslims to live in Western countries. Furthermore, unproductive 
disagreements among Muslim leaders are misleadingly based on taqiyya. 
Taqiyya also complicates the counter-terrorism especially on some 
occasions such as refusing to investigate other Muslims or writing some 
misleading translations (Campbell, 2005b: 27-30). However, Campbell’s 
analysis is wrong because the oppressive regimes imply the need for 
taqiyya. Had multiculturalism created a favorable condition for taqiyya, 
Muslims would not split into various sects. In other words, Shia Muslims, 
Indian Guptis, and Spanish Moriscos didn’t need to face unjustified 
oppression across history had there been a spirit of multiculturalism. 
Moreover, Campbell erroneously generalizes that taqiyya be applied to 
all Muslims across the school of thoughts (mazhab). He dismisses the 
fact that not all Muslims accept taqiyya either as a concept or a praxis. 
Moreover, he unconvincingly proposes that taqiyya supports terrorism, 
and he dismisses the most important concept of jihad akbar (the greater 
jihad) as a personal struggle against one’s own natural appetite. 
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Taqiyya under the threat of persecution is obviously different from 
infiltrating intentionally into a country and then camouflaging themselves 
like chameleons do. The former is justified while the latter is an aberration 
of taqiyya. In taqiyya, there is no feeling of guilt because faith remains 
intact. If a person of taqiyya feels guilty, then his or her faith might not 
be firm, and this case could not be considered as taqiyya. In other words, 
the notion of disgust does not exist in the concept of taqiyya because 
one faces the threat of persecution. Moreover, taqiyya cannot be morally 
used as a military tactic to attack others as applied by the assassins and 
Fedayeen led by Hassan-i Sabbah (1040-1124); but it is merely a shield 
against unjustified persecution. Therefore, taqiyya should be practiced 
in a passive way. In contrast, some practices of taqiyya which I have 
discussed above seem to be an aberration of the concept of taqiyya because 
those practices ignore the existence of persecutions. Furthermore, I will 
consider taqiyya as a duty which is embedded in the Ten Commandments 
in the following section. 
the ninth Commandment 
By considering the connection of taqiyya with the Ninth 
Commandment, I wish I could show whether or not taqiyya could be 
considered a negative moral duty. One out of the Ten Commandments 
states “Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor.” Such 
command is literally the particular negative. Consequently, some 
questions could be raised here. Is such a commandment comparable with the 
prohibition on lying? This section suggests that they are a bit different due 
to their scope and acts. The scope of the ninth commandment is relatively 
specific compared to the prohibition on lying. The former encompasses 
merely our neighbors but it suggests that one is allowed to bear false 
witness against, for instance, strangers. Not only did God reveal the Torah 
and the Bible where God commands directives for living in a specific 
society at a specific time. In contrast, it is considered that God revealed 
Qur’an for all societies at all times. 
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Moreover, is there any similarity between ‘bearing false witness’ 
and ‘lying’? There is according to its conceptual components. Evidence, 
proof and testimony constitute the component of witness. In contrast, 
saying falsehoods constitute the component of lying. Therefore, one 
could see a difference between ‘bearing false witness’ and ‘lying.’ Next, 
is it essential to distinguish between our neighbors and non-neighbors? 
It is essential because neighbors play a direct interaction to us while 
non-neighbors do not. Indeed, some (if not most) Indonesians conceive 
neighbors as equal family. This might also be the case in other South 
East Asian countries such as Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, Southern 
Thailand, Southern Philippines. In other words, some cultures allow 
to distinguishing neighbors and non-neighbors based on the notion of 
familiarity. Therefore, there might be some differences between our duties 
to our neighbors and our duties to non-neighbors. On the one hand, for 
one lying to neighbors is unjustified while, on the other hand, for one 
lying to non-neighbors is justified according to a strict interpretation of 
the Ninth Commandment. 
There are two prohibitions here. Firstly, is a prohibition not to bear 
false witness against our neighbors (the particular negative due to its scope), 
and suggests that one might bear false witness against non-neighbors. 
Secondly, is a prohibition not to lie (the universal negative due to its 
scope). This prohibition is a universal duty that one ought not to break 
under any circumstance. Taqiyya violates the Ninth Commandment 
because the latter is a token of a deontological approach. It means that 
one ought not break it in any situation. This seems to be consistent 
with the Prophet’s, Imam Ali’s and Imam Hussein’s positions as I have 
discussed above. 
speaking Justly 
This section will attempt to demonstrate that the obligation stated 
in the Ninth Commandment is different from the obligation stated in the 
Holy Qur’an. By establishing such distinction, I hope I could show that 
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Muslims follow a moral obligation that differs somewhat from Jews and 
Christians. Moreover, advocates of taqiyya could argue that taqiyya does 
not deal with lies but rather with justice because Qur’an does not express 
its message in the way the Ninth Commandment does. Surah Al-An’am 
verse 151-2 states: 
“Say: “Come, I will rehearse what God hath (really) pro-
hibited you from”: Joint not anything as equal with Him; 
be Good to your parents; kill not your children on a plea of 
want; We provide sustenance for you and for them; come 
not nigh to shameful deeds. Whether open or secret; take 
not life, which God hath made sacred, except by way of 
justice and law: thus doth He command you, that ye may 
learn wisdom. And come not nigh to the orphan’s property, 
except to improve it, until he attain the age of full strength; 
give measure and weight with (full) justice; no burden do 
We place on any soul, but that which it can bear; whenever 
ye speak, speak justly, even if a near relative is concerned; 
and fulfill the covenant of God: thus doth He command 
you, that ye may remember” (Q. S. Al-An’am: 151-2 in 
Ali, NY: 133). 
Those two verses speak about the negative duties for Muslims such 
as 1) no allegiance against Allah; 2) be good to our parents (the Second 
Commandment in a sequential order); 3) no killing of our own children 
(be specific than the Ten Commandments); 4) avoid disgraceful deeds; 5) 
no unjustified, unlawful killing; 6) no appropriation of orphans’ wealth 
unless it is for the purpose of improving their condition; 7) speak justly 
though our own relatives might not be in favor of it; 8) fulfill the Gods’ 
covenant. The deontological approach in ethics pays attention to such 
duties though it refers the Ten Commandments. Yet, there is a distinction 
concerning the duty about speaking between the Ninth Commandment 
and the Qur’an. On the one hand, the former only deals with the 
prohibition against lying to our neighbors as I have discussed in the 
previous section. On the other hand, the latter deals with the command to 
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speak justly. Speaking justly means expressing one’s feeling concerning 
what is morally fair or right. Therefore, it compels humans to speak the 
truth even though our own relatives could consequently suffer punishment.  
Speaking justly is obviously different from the Ninth Commandment in 
the Old Testament. An obvious difference is that just speaking has the 
scope of universal affirmative, to wit, a general positive command towards 
all human beings. If speaking honestly implies a persecution, then one 
can lie for the sake of their life, and such lying should be considered as a 
form of justice over himself or herself. Such preservation is much more 
important compared to, for instance, breathing and eating which are also 
essential for our life. In short, speaking justly might include taqiyya in a 
very specific context, lying for the sake of preserving ourselves against 
the threat of persecution. 
By those differences on such categorical syllogism, we can see that 
the Ninth Commandment -- according to the Old Testament -- contains 
some differences compared to the one within Qur’an. This is significant 
for our comparison because we should comprehend taqiyya and its 
justifications correctly. 
Speaking justly could not establish taqiyya because they comprise 
different structures. On the one hand, taqiyya comprises persecution and 
religious dissimulation. On the other hand, speaking justly comprises 
utterances and justifiable aims. The notion of speaking justly might 
imply taqiyya but not necessarily establishing it. Similarly, the concept 
of speaking justly is not compatible with the concept of taqiyya because 
the previous deals with a larger scope compared to the latter. 
Taqiyya’s opponents might perceive taqiyya to be equal with 
cunning in the sense of skills to evade or deceive in order to achieve 
goals. On the one hand, evasion could contain a lesser moral problem 
compared to deception because it means answering questions indirectly. 
On the other hand, deceit obscures the true sense of taqiyya, and indeed 
it distorts it. Here, I should reiterate dissimulations do not necessarily 
mean deceptions though it might be consistent with evasion. Indeed, 
evasion plays a significant role in the realm of diplomacy. Interestingly, 
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some people -- such as Najmuddin Tufi -- refers taqiyya to other ideas 
such as diplomacy, common sense and tolerance (Tufi in Rizvi, 1992: 14). 
Unfortunately, neither Tufi nor Rizvi create any argument to support it. 
Yet, we could comprehend that in taqiyya, evasion and diplomacy are 
consistent though this could not be the case with common sense and 
tolerance. Here, Tufi’s argument rebuts Campbell’s distinction between 
taqiyya and diplomacy as I have discussed above. 
Moreover, Imam Fakhruddin ar-Razi conceives four rules of 
taqiyya. First, professing religion and manifesting enmity or friendship 
are two permissible conditions for conducting taqiyya. Yet, taqiyya could 
not be misused as tools for disclosing the weakness of Muslims’ defense, 
defaming a married woman, usurping properties, adultery and implying the 
killing of the third parties. Secondly, taqiyya – according to the mazhab 
Imam Syafi’i – may be conducted in the case of facing polytheistic rulers 
although the Qur’anic indirect permitting of taqiyya strictly refers to the 
case of facing infidels. Thirdly, taqiyya may be conducted in the case 
of protecting property due to the Prophet’s view that the holiness of 
Muslims’ blood is equal with the sanctity of their property. Therefore, they 
who are slain in defending their property could be regarded as martyrs. 
Fourthly, due to the obligation to avoid harm, Muslims are permitted to 
conduct taqiyya up to the Day of Resurrection (Ar-Razi in Rizvi, 1992: 
p. 7-8). Nonetheless, the third point is problematic due to the concept of 
taqiyya itself. The concept pays no attention to the protection of property 
unless our own bodies can be considered as a sort of property as in the 
case of Nozick’s libertarianism.  Thereby, releasing property in order to 
avoid costly calamity could be consequentially justified as a trade off with 
the religious belief. Furthermore, the fourth point exposes the criticism 
such as what sort of harm might justify a long-run taqiyya? Harm which 
is done in a just war is obviously morally different from harm which is 
caused by terrorism. Thereby, extending the duration of taqiyya up to the 
Day of Resurrection is a form of exaggeration. 
Interestingly, Imam Ali expressed an interesting account against 
taqiyya whenever he received an oath of loyalty from the companions as 
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follow: “By Allah, I have not concealed a single word or spoken any lie and 
I had been informed of this event and of this time (Sermon 16 in Thalib, 
2009: 351). It means that Imam Ali himself was arguably reluctant to lie 
and conceal words or, to put it in other way, he does not resort to taqiyya 
because the latter does not allow us to speak justly either to ourselves or 
to other persons. Therefore, adherents should not apply taqiyya to Hazrat 
Ali’s life but consider it in the sense of speaking justly. By developing 
it, proponents would take benefit from the art of speaking including an 
evasion, as diplomacy, and not telling ‘all’ known things. This mode of 
thinking would shape the practices of taqiyya in a positive way though it 
would constitute a deviation of taqiyya from its original concept.
 
persecution or social exclusion? 
This section will discuss whether dissimulators can justify their 
actions based on mere social exclusion instead of persecution? Additionally, 
can the social exclusion be a prerequisite of persecution? And if so, can 
performing taqiyya based on social exclusion be justifiable? 
Taqiyya should always be understood through consequentialist 
and utilitarian (the maslahat-mafsadat) approaches because its concept 
actually reflects trade off between life and faith. If taqiyya is examined 
by the deontological and virtuous approaches, then taqiyya would be in 
contradiction with the Ninth Commandment as I have discussed above. 
By allowing religious dissimulation against persecution, life – under the 
banner of taqiyya – is given emphasis over religion. Nevertheless, some 
Shi’ite imams conceive this differently; that it is not life but religion which 
should be preserved by taqiyya. By placing religion as the taqiyya’s sole 
aim, taqiyya enjoys the status of urgency in Islam. Additionally, they 
wish taqiyya would be widely accepted by all Muslims in such a way. 
Therefore, they imply that religion is more important than life. They 
nevertheless dismiss the fact that religion without the life of its Ummah 
would be meaningless for a certain period of time. Moreover, they also 
push aside the existence and purity of Islam which are located in the Holy 
Qur’an instead of its Ummah. Therefore, religions could not outweigh life. 
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Persecution and preserving life justify the existence of taqiyya. By 
preserving life, one has more chance to develop one’s belief, knowledge, 
and other meaningful things. Another argument in favor of taqiyya is 
apparently concealing faith justly. A just concealment contains a lesser evil 
compared to being killed or unjustly persecuted. However, taqiyya seems 
to be ineffective concerning some injustices. For example, Indonesian 
Shii Muslims do not face persecution nowadays, but unjust expulsion 
by Indonesian Sunni Muslims. Based upon the latter’s ignorance some 
conflicts occurred in Sampang, Madura, Jawa and Timur. Misunderstanding 
of what Shiism is seems to be the cause. They argue that Shia is not a 
part of Islam because it follows different pillars of Islam.  In contrast, 
Maduranese Shii Muslims cannot resort to taqiyya based on expulsion. 
If expulsion is persecution, then their taqiyya would be justifiable on the 
basis of persecution. 
Mortimer pays attention to the role of taqiyya in the sense that the 
Imams of Ithna Ashari allows their followers to hide their religious beliefs 
if necessary. Moreover, Mortimer does not believe that taqiyya preserves 
the existence of Twelver Shiite but rather the latter was not political or did 
not historically involve in the action-oriented-politics. Indeed, nine out 
of twelve Imams after Hussein did not pursue their rights to reign. They 
preferred instead to live an ascetic life (zuhd)  (Mortimer, 1984: 37-8). 
The cost-benefit analysis approach is sometimes rejected, because 
it seems to involve the idea of a trade-off. Indeed, it exchanges things that 
are not commodities such as life, pride, and honor. Nevertheless, such 
analysis can be useful for Islamic reasoning to some extent. For example, 
Imam Ja’far Sadiq exercises a cost-benefit (mafsadat-maslahat) analysis 
to rebut Abu Hanifah: 
“Then, in order to invalidate ‘analogical reasoning’, the 
holy Imam mentioned some instances of Islamic legal 
rulings opposed to this principle. He said, “Which one is 
worse, killing somebody unjustly or committing adultery?” 
“Killing someone unjustly.” 
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“Now if acting upon analogical reasoning is to be 
correct, why are two witnesses enough to convict somebody 
of murder, but four are necessary for convicting somebody 
of adultery? Is this Islamic ruling in accordance with 
analogical reasoning?” 
“No.” 
“Which one is more important, prayer or fasting?” 
“Prayer.” 
“So why is it incumbent on menstruating women to make 
up for obligatory fasting, while this is not the case with 
obligatory prayer? Is this Islamic ruling concurrent with 
analogical reasoning?” 
“No” (‘Ala’i, 2012: 50-1). 
By rhetorically asking Abu Hanifah, Imam Ja’far weighs those two 
worships in the sense of consequentialism but not necessarily a trade-off. 
Thereby, weighing is also necessary in order to rebut the way Abu Hanifah 
issued a fatwa which is based on an analogy. Such dialogue teaches us 
that a consequentialist approach could be exercised in Islam to some 
extent. If I am right, then taqiyya is one example of such account which 
is morally allowable under the threat of persecution. 
Nowadays, proponents of taqiyya seem to hide their belief on the 
basis of avoiding social exclusion rather than unjustified persecution. 
Social exclusion means the state or the process of being denied or being 
removed from consideration. In ancient Greek, they practiced social 
exclusion on the basis of popular vote as in the case of the ostracism of 
Thucydides.  Such basis is however problematic because it does not refer 
to the concept of taqiyya. If this is the case, then they do not actually 
practice taqiyya. 
Qusthan Firdaus   27
A constant worry about historical violence could blur a significant 
distinction between persecution and social exclusion. Such exclusion leads 
followers to be cautious while living among the majority of either Sunni 
Muslims or infidels. The idea that ‘social exclusion equals persecution’ 
is used as a justification for dissimulating their beliefs. This assumes 
that there is a slippery slope where social exclusion leads ultimately to 
persecution. But social exclusion refers to denial of privileges, rights 
and status in a social system as a consequence of his or her identity. 
If you deny someone for any reason, then you do not necessarily need 
to persecute him either. So the difference between social exclusion and 
persecution is clear although they share a similarity. But if the claim of 
a slippery slope can be rejected and so the practices of taqiyya can be 
seen to violate its concept. This phenomenon is problematic because the 
reason for taqiyya seems to be misused by its proponents. If the discontent 
of social exclusion is confused with the fear of persecution, then such 
dissimulation can no longer be considered taqiyya. 
Conclusion 
To understand the concept of taqiyya involves understanding its 
connection with the threat of persecution and religious dissimulation. 
These fundamental components cannot be ignored in practicing taqiyya. 
Indeed, taqiyya is conceptually coherent though some practices divert 
from the concept. The obvious diversion is shifting the notion of 
persecution by the social exclusion. If this is the case, then such practice 
is no longer taqiyya. Moreover, taqiyya violates the Ninth Commandment 
in the way we comprehend it according to the Old Testament viz., the 
commandment ‘not to bear false witness.’ On the contrary, taqiyya does 
not violate any moral duty because Muslims comprehend such duty 
according to the Qur’an, to wit, speaking justly which could be perceived 
as a positive duty. If my argument is sound, then the deviant practices 
of taqiyya can be compared with the defense tactics of chameleons. 
Chameleons need not hide themselves since their ability to adjust their 
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color with their environment is more than enough to protect themselves. 
If the gap between the concept and the practice remains as it is, then the 
maxim could be, ‘taqiyya is like a hiding chameleon, the hiding chameleon 
of my forefathers. They who do not have taqiyya, are not chameleons.’ 
endnotes
1Even LIPI’s (the Indonesian Institute of Sciences) researchers inappropriately 
attribute the word taqiyya to the NII (the Islamic State of Indonesia) IX. They claim, 
“If violence could be avoided so far, according to Asep, that is because they realize that 
their group is too small to fight against the Islamic mainstream. Under this condition, 
they exercise the taqiyya doctrine which is hiding their actual belief” (Afadlal et. al, 
2005: 247). As a consequence, those researchers think that taqiyya is not a specific 
utilitarian account in the realm of Shi’ism but could also be applied in other school of 
thoughts (mazhab). 
2Debates about the sequence of commandment among Judaism, Catholicism 
and Christianity are beyond the constraints of this article. The Septuagint, Philo, Talmud 
and the Reformed Christians agreed to perceive it as the ninth.
3interestingly, the word ‘dissimulation’ means ‘mudárát’ while ‘to dissimulate’ 
means ‘durúghί nimúdan’ in Farsi. Therefore, one could argue that taqiyya contains 
mudárát in and of itself though this view is unlikely to be defended in a case like 
persecution.
4Taqiyya is not equal to hypocrisy for some reasons. Firstly, both ideas contain 
a different concept. Hypocrisy refers show off about the high standards anything though 
this is not the case. Moreover, hypocrisy connotes to the inconsistency between deeds 
and utterances while, in contrast, taqiyya means the religious dissimulation in the face 
of persecution. Secondly, taqiyya means concealing beliefs and displaying nonbeliefs 
but otherwise hypocrisy means concealing unbeliefs and declaring faith as be indicated 
by Al-Baqarah verse 14: “When they meet those who believe, they say: “We believe;” 
but when they are alone with their evil ones, they say: “We are really with you: 
we (were) only jesting” (Ali, NY: 3).
5interestingly, Abdullah Yusuf Ali does not use the word ‘piety’ but rather 
‘righteous’ in such verse. He translates as follow: “O mankind! We created you from a 
single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may 
know each other (not that ye may despise each other). Verily the most honoured of you 
in the sight of God is (he who is) the most righteous of you. And God has full knowledge 
and is well-acquainted (with all things)” (Ali, NY: 514). ‘Piety’ is constituted by the 
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quality of being reverent or religious but ‘righteous’ deals with the moral status or the 
justifiable conditions of actions or things.
6Some capital letters are originally given by Hobbes.
7Campbell conceives kitman to be equal with deception in his later writing 
(Campbell, 2006b: 5).
8Here, I should admit that I am neglecting the potentially different meanings 
in Arabic and English words. But any discussion regarding the problem with these 
translations would be beyond the scope this article.
9Robert Nozick mentioned once the notion of self-ownership in his Anarchy, 
State and Utopia. Then, G. A. Cohen extrapolated it as the fundamental idea of Nozick’s 
libertarianism. Cohen indeed conceived that the concept of self-ownership is coherent 
in and of itself though the thesis might be false. Further discussion about self-ownership 
could be gained from Cohen’s Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality.
10The existence of Divine Justice (adil) and Imamah (a recognized authority 
on Islamic theology, law and a spiritual guide) in Shiism are two substantial differences 
from Sunni. Regarding the Imamah, one might argue that such idea is discriminatory 
due to its lineage to the Prophet. Nonetheless, such argument is irrelevant because the 
Shii Imamah is based not only on the lineage but also knowledge and to some degree the 
bravery to call a resistance against unjust regimes. This bravery indeed implies various 
sects even within the Shii Muslims such as the Twelver/Itsna Asyariah, the Sevener/
Ismailiyah, the Fiver/Zaydi, the Druze, the Nizari/Agha Khani, the Daudi/Bohra, the 
Hafizi and the other Bohra.
11Zuhd does not contain an equal meaning compared to asceticism. A further 
explanation about such distinction could be obtained from Mutahhari’s introduction in 
Nahjul-Balagha (Mutahhari in Ali, 2009: 112-3).
12According to Snodgrass, the ostracism is caused by his failure to rescue an 
Athenian colony called Ampipholis from the invasion of Brasida of Sparta (Snodgrass, 
1988: 303).
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